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ABSTRACT: In his book Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis, Ferenc 
Huoranszki (2011) tries to defend improved and amended version of the condi-
tional analysis of free will. In my critical review, taking chapters 2 and 4 of his 
book as the most crucial for his theory, I try to show that incompatibilism is still 
more persuasive and that amended conditional analysis is not compatible with 
determinism. Despite my criticism, I consider this book as a significant contribu-
tion to the free will debate.
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The problem of free will, since Epicurus (Huby 1969), is one of the clas-
sical philosophical problems. Ferenc Huoranszki (2011), in his book Free 
Will: A Conditional Analysis, has made really a very significant contri-
bution to this debate. The book is very carefully and scrupulously writ-
ten with clear, detailed and interesting arguments. Of course, as someone 
said1, no two philosophers ever agreed on a single matter, so I would like 
to challenge some of Huoranszki’s claims.
The question is whether agents such as human beings have freedom 
of the will and freedom of the action. Namely, we can ask whether an 
agent “could have done otherwise”–– meaning that despite the fact that an 
agent chose to A at time t or did A at time t, he could have done something 
else instead at time t. In slightly other words, we can ask whether an agent 
has the ability to chose A or not-A at t or to do A or not-A at t, though, of 
course, at t he will do one of those things. In still other formulation, we 
can ask whether it is within agent’s power to choose A or not-A or to do A 
or not-A, at time t.
1 I really do not remember from whom or where I read or heard this nice sentence. 
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In his book, Huoranszki aims at defending compatibilism with a de-
veloped variant of the so-called conditional analysis of free will. Condi-
tional analysis is originally put forward by Moore (1912), but aim here is 
not to defend Moore’s classical version. Rather, Huoranszki develops his 
more modern version. Perhaps this is one of the strongest recent attempts 
to defend compatibilism.
I consider chapter 2 (Powers and Possibilities), and chapter 4 (The 
Conditional Analysis of Free Will), as the most crucial ones for establish-
ing the compatibilistic theory of free will, so I shall focus on the claims 
and arguments put forward in these chapters. If we can put them in ques-
tion then establishing compatibilism is in serious doubt.
One of the crucial tasks for a defender of compatibilism may be to 
show that arguments for incompatibilism are, at least, not so convincing 
and persuasive or that they “do not conclusively prove that determinism 
and the freedom of the will are incompatible” (Huoranszki 2011: 27). This 
is the content of the second chapter of the book. In this chapter the conse-
quence argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism is 
(re)considered. The most famous version is van Inwagen’s (1983) version. 
He gave three somewhat different arguments for incompatibilism and the 
first and the third are discussed by Huoranszki. Let’s review this discus-
sion. Van Inwagen’s (1983: 16) formulation of incompatibilism sounds 
like this:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of 
nature and the events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on 
before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. 
Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are 
not up to us.
The third argument for incompatibilism is a modal argument and goes like 
this (van Inwagen, 1983: 93–104):
“L” denotes the conjuction of all the natural laws; Abbreviation “P0” 
denotes state of the universe at some moment in the past; “P” stands for 
any true proposition. “Np” means “p, and no one has, or ever had, any 
choice about whether p.” “□” stands for “necessarily”. “((P0&L)→P)” 
is the abbreviation of the thesis of determinism: the conjuction of state-
ments that completely describe a state of the universe at some particular 
time in the past and all the laws of nature entail each event and every-
thing that happens after (and before) that particular past time. Beside 
standard rules of inference, two more rules of inference are used by van 
Inwagen also:
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Rule α: If □p, then Np.
Rule β2: If Np and N(p→q), then Nq
Now, the argument proceeds:
1. □((P0&L)→P)   thesis of determinism
2. □(P0→(L→P))  from 1 by the law of exportation
3. N(P’0→(L→P))   from 2 by rule α
4. NP0    premise
5. N(L→P)   from 3, 4, and rule β
6. NL    premise
7. NP    from 5, 6 and rule β.
Huoranszki thinks that this is a strong argument, but nevertheless, a 
problematic account: more precisely, it is problematic because the opera-
tor Np or “No choice principle” and rule β, when premises are clarified, 
“lose all the appeal”. It is true that agents cannot have power over what the 
laws of nature are and cannot have power over the past events, but Huoran-
szki claims that there is a significant difference between the past and the 
future. For the future, it is interesting whether we have a choice about what 
will happen and whether we can thus influence the outcome of the future 
(Huoranszki 2011: 17). Huoranszki thinks that the phrase “no one has, or 
ever had, any choice about” must mean the same in the premises and in 
the conclusion for the argument to be valid, which is, of course, correct; he 
also says that this phrase cannot be an interpretation of the aforementioned 
phrase “not up to us” (Huoranszki: 17). If the phrase “no one has, or ever 
had, any choice about” means what compatibilists as well as incompatibil-
ists accept, namely that we cannot now act in such a way to influence the 
past and that we cannot have any influence about what the laws of nature 
are, then this phrase, says Huoranszki, cannot in obvious way be applied to 
the present and future and about propositions which say something about 
present and future actions, and, of course, it has to be applied in that sense. 
But why not? Huoranszki (2011: 17) says that
[w]e can and often do choose to do something in the future and in this sense 
have a choice about the truth of propositions that express future events; and 
often we choose to do something in the present in order to bring about some-
thing in the future and in this sense we can have choice about future states 
of affairs.
2 Rule β proved to be controversial but this other controversy will not be discussed 
here: see McKay and Johnson (1996), Finch and Warfield (1998) and van Inwagen 
(2002).
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Before I discuss this claim on two examples that Huoranszki uses, let’s 
prepare the matters. First of all, I would like to say that determinism is not 
so abstract as Huoranszki thinks. It can be understood fairly enough. In 
terms of some state of the universe at time t and laws of nature, determin-
ism means that when all the ingredients of the universe, with their (inter-
nal) structures, are at their place at t, according to the basic laws of the 
universe (which can combine to make laws of higher levels), which apply 
to them, uniquely specify their position at every other moment in time, 
whatever these ingredients are (microscopic particles, clusters of clusters 
of galaxies, mental processes, events). Power of the laws of nature pre-
cludes anything but one outcome (for the entire deterministic universe) for 
each and every ingredient of that universe and for each and every moment 
of that universe. If this is so, then this power of the laws of nature acting 
on some state of the universe disables things and agents of doing anything 
else except what they do at moment t, moreover, at any time t. So, it seems 
that there can be no ability to do otherwise at t, because it is precluded by 
the laws of nature.
Huoranszki tries to explain that “up to me” phrase means that “I have 
intentional control over…” expressing whatever distinguishes our talk-
ing and walking from our heart beating or temperature keeping constant 
(Huoranszki 2011: 13):
I can have intentional control over my walking and talking but I cannot in-
tentionally control my heartbeat or my body temperature. Apply now the 
consequence argument to this understanding of “up to us”. Certainly I do 
not (cannot) have intentional control over the remote past or over the physi-
cal laws of the universe. And if determinism is true, then there is a sense in 
which my present behavior is the consequence of the remote past and the 
laws of nature. Does it follow that I do not (cannot) have intentional control 
over my present actions either?
Obviously, yes. So, exactly the opposite answer seems to me as a correct 
one than is given by Huoranszki (he says obviously not!) if determinism 
is true: we do not have intentions in control and we have not intentional-
ity in this sense in control. It only seems (from the very content of inten-
tions and intentional states) that we have control over them and over our 
decision processess, decisions and actions (though we do not). Intentional 
states and intentions themselves would be products of laws of nature and 
previous states and the whole chain of our deciding and choosing would 
be exactly in every step fully determined if determinism is true. So there 
is no difference between heartbeat and “intentional” action. Intentional 
actions are only perhaps more complicated and have a mental feature or 
subjective feature. But this mentality or subjectivity is also only a product 
493D. PEĆNJAK: Not the Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis 
of the laws of nature and states of the universe in the remote past if the 
thesis of determinism is true.
So, if determinism is true, intentions are determined (as everything 
else) by laws of nature and initial states. Intentional control over an action 
would mean that I have within my power to do A or not-A at time t, de-
spite I do only one of these actions––because no one can do two mutually 
exclusive actions at the same time––but it is not as such if determinism is 
true.
Let’s get to the examples. Huoranszki uses van Inwagen’s own exam-
ple of a judge who will, by raising his hand, put a veto on death penalty 
for a certain criminal but the judge does not raise a hand so the criminal 
is executed. It seems that future for the criminal is dependent on the judge 
and that he has within his power what will happen to the criminal, but that 
the criminal does not have that power. But the question is: whether the 
judge has within his power raising his hand?
It seems that he does not, if determinism is true; and if so, then judge 
by himself is not a factor which does something about the future with 
his hand which stayed down, but something else does. If determinism is 
the case, then judge is in the same position of doing for the future as is a 
criminal. Let me explain. Dwelling on what is said above, we can say the 
following.
You don’t have a choice about your choosing, moreover, you don’t 
have any choice about each and every step in your “choosing” if deter-
minism is true. It is because mental events and processes are themselves 
subordinated (as events) to determinism (“choosing” is a mental process) 
in the way that each and every step of any mental process and event is 
also just the product of some initial state of the universe and the laws of 
nature. We only passively introspect these events then (in the first-per-
son mode), but we do not influence them if determinism holds. When ac-
tions are outcomes of these processes, they are fully determined as well as 
each and every mental step in deciding and choosing had been determined 
(by previous states and the laws of nature) so chain of determination just 
proceeds (through us); so there is no real choosing between two or more 
possibilities on equal grounds with a real possibility that one or the other 
action would be done on the part of the person or agent. Not raising of the 
judge’s hand is in such a way determined in advance that no other real op-
tion exists––there is no any option for him to raise his hand in a determin-
istic universe. So it is not him who influences the future. The future is, as 
the past, completely and fully fixed because it is set by initial state of the 
universe and the laws of nature of that universe if it is deterministic. There 
would be only one unique history or “flow of events” in a deterministic 
universe.
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Next example is about a professional assassin who is asked to kill Bill 
for a certain amount of money. Assassin rejects the offer because of small 
amount of money offered. But, also, unknown to the assassin, Bill already 
died yesterday to natural causes.
Huoranszki (2011: 19) tries to destabilize incompatibilism and deter-
minism with the following:
Did the assasin make a choice about whether or not to kill Bill? It seems 
obvious that he did exercise his ability to choose. He faced alternatives. He 
considered seriously what to do. He was mentally sane and uncompelled. 
He made up his mind. At the end of his deliberation he might have even said 
‘I have made a choice. I reject the offer. I choose not to kill Bill’. It seems 
to me rather implausible to claim that whether or not he actually made a 
chioce in the sense which entails the exertion of his psychological ability to 
choose must depend on circumstances totally external to his mental opera-
tions. Further, this would imply that, when next day he hears the news that 
Bill had already been dead, he should say ‘Well, so I did not make a chioce’. 
My question is: what then did he exactly do instead of making a chioce? I do 
not think anyone can tell.
I can tell. The assasin was under the governance of (physical) laws of 
nature that governed each and every thought and the outcome of these 
thoughts on which there was no influence of the assasin; he was just pas-
sive observer of what happens in his consciousness as “making a chioce” 
or deliberation, but that choosing or deliberation was already contained 
(implied) by the state of the universe from a distant past (even in the first 
initial state of the deterministic universe) plus laws of nature; it only 
looked or seemed from the inside, from the first person view, as if the as-
sasin independently makes “his own” choice, independently of any other 
factor. Steps in deciding and choosing what to do were in fact sequences 
of thoughts that were long ago determined (by some state of the universe 
and the laws of nature) as, for example, Earth’s orbiting around the sun 
is completely determined long ago and Earth does not do (and, of course, 
cannot do) anything about it. If determinism is true, then living conscious 
beings are not different in principle from inanimate object in the sense 
how they move around and what they do.
So, this is what assasin “does”, regardless of whether Bill is dead or 
alive (and we can, of course, generalize this; so, under the hypothesis of 
determinisim it is what and how anyone “does” something.)
It seems that it follows that the phrase “no one has, or ever had, any 
choice about” has the same meaning in the premises as in the conclusion. 
The phrase means that each and every event only depends on initial state 
and the laws and that nothing else has any influence on what happens and 
what propositions are true or false. Everything can be explained taking 
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into account only a full description of some state or initial state of the 
universe and the laws of that universe––which obtained long before any 
human being came into existence. So it seems that argument for incom-
patibilism goes unshattered.
Huoranszki builds his improved and modified version of compatibi-
listic conditional version of free will analysis, in chapter 4, on Moore’s 
classical version and says that he also follows Locke’s spirit in this analy-
sis. First he cites Moore (1912: 220–221):
It is quite certain (1) that we often should have acted differently, if we had 
chosen to; (2) that similarly we often should have chosen differently, if we 
had so to chose; and (3) that it was almost always possible that we should 
have chosen differently, in the sense that no man could know for certain that 
we should not so choose. All these three things are facts, and all of them 
quite consistent with the principle of causality.
Huoranszki shows that this classical version is vulnerable to several ob-
jections and so this form of conditional free will analysis is inadequate and 
should be amended. The most serious objection, which Huoranszki ac-
cepts, is Lehrer’s (1968: 29): “It is logically possible that a man could not 
have done what he would have done, if he willed to, chose to, tried to, or 
what not”. Lehrer’s (1968: 31–32) example is with the implanted device:
It is possible that as a result of my not willing, not choosing, or not under-
taking some action, I might lose any of my powers. If we allow ourselves 
to be somewhat fanciful, it is easy to imagine how this would come about. 
Suppose that, unknown to myself, a small object has been implanted in my 
brain, and that when a button is pushed by a demonic being who implanted 
this object, I became temporarily paralyzed and unable to act. My not choos-
ing to perform an act might cause button to be pushed and thereby render 
me unable to act.
Huoranszki (2011: 64) comments:
Lehrer shows that even if an agent would do otherwise if he had chosen so, 
he can nonetheless lose that ability simply by not performing the pertinent 
action. … in Lehrer’s example, an ability is lost whenever it is not chosen 
to be exercised. And it is exactly for this reason that the simple conditional 
analysis breaks down in these cases.
To amend this, Huoranszki says that the definition must be supplemented 
by the condition which explicitly states that “objects do not change in 
respect to their relevant abilities in circumstances when these abilities are 
about to become manifest” (Huoranszki 2011: 64). Conditional analysis 
must incorporate this condition both about performing an action and mak-
ing a choice.
According to what is said, the final proposal is the following:
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S’s will is free in the sense of having the ability to perform an actually un-
performed action A at t iff S would have done A, if (1) S had chosen so and 
(2) had not changed with respect to her ability to perform A at t and (3) had 
not changed with respect to her ability to make choice about whether or not 
to perform a at t. (Huoranszki 2011: 66).
Still, as I would like to show, this would not be compatible with determin-
ism because of the very nature of determinism.
Though this amended conditional analysis is, perhaps, resistant, as 
shown by Huoranszki, to the objections of circularity and infinite regress 
which jeopardize classical view (Moore’s), still this is not compatible with 
physical determinism. Why? Because, if determinism is true, we change with 
respect to our abilities to perform something at t and we change with respect 
to our abilities to make choice about whether or not to perform some action 
at t. Namely, what we do or choose is, if determisim holds, fully determined 
at t and only one event, action or choice happens or can happen then. All 
other things are precluded by the chain of determination which disable you 
at t to do anything else except what you do. So, we can say the following. 
Chain of events at t–1 fully and uniquely determines the event at t; let’s call 
this event E. If so, then any other event is physically impossible to happen. 
Hence, no other ability can be existent at t except ability to realize E. So if 
determinative chain or sequence prevents you at t to do not-E, then at t you 
do not have, you do not retain, ability to do not-E. The same we can say for 
choosing: if determinative chain or sequence prevents you at t to choose not-
E, then at t you do not have, you do not retain, ability to choose not-E.
I would like to illustrate this with the example Huoranszki uses him-
self, but only slightly modified. This modification serves only to reinforce 
the example and does not alter it in the slightest. When the top high-jump 
sportsman has broken leg, he does not have an ability to make his standard 
jump of 235 cm. Likewise when he has serious influenza or so. Factors 
which made his leg to be broken further make, together with his, now, bro-
ken leg, that he can move around in a limited way; or, these factors make 
that his metabolism functions differently when having influenza from how 
they function in a normal healthy way; namely, this ill function of the 
metabolism deprive him of (an ability of) jumping 235 cm. This standard 
jump of our top high-jumper is thus prevented during the illness. But the 
same holds for common everyday factors which make things, actions and 
“choices” happen. Common everyday factors which lead to and determine 
some action at t prevent all other actions to happen at t, if determinism is 
true; so agents do not have abilities at t to do otherwise than they do.
Everything else is prevented at t if determinism is the case; abilities 
are then transient and agents change with respect to their abilities to per-
form A at t and agents change with respect to their ability to make choice 
about whether or not to perform A at t.
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Let’s make things even clearer. When Vitali Klitschko holds you tight 
and, for example, moves your hand around, you are not strong enough to 
resist it, however you try: Klitschko makes your hand to move around in 
circles at time t. You do not have an ability to do something else at t. This is 
how determination operates if determinism is true. So, at time t, if you are, 
for example, made by ordinary factors to paint a picture, in a deterministic 
universe it is the same as it is the case when Klitschko holds you; you do 
not have an ability to do otherwise or something else instead at t. Since the 
phrase “at time t” is general and can refer to any time, and since the thesis 
of determinism is also general, it means that always, when agents do some-
thing, they have no ability to do otherwise. The same holds for choosing.
This suggests that even an improved conditional analysis cannot be 
compatible with determinism and, as such, if determinism would be true, 
it cannot deliver freedom of the will. So, it seems that incompatibilism is 
still much more persuasive. Further question––whether hard determinism 
or libertarianism is true for our universe3 I shall not pursue here––but just 
say that I would take side of libertarianism.
My interest here has been to defend incompatibilism, so at a risk to be 
somewhat unfair, I shall not present many virtues which we can find in the 
rest of the book––I shall only very briefly say a word or two.
In other parts of the book, which I do not have space here to discuss, 
for example, in the chapters on rationality or intelligibility, Huoranszki 
gives many insights which are interesting and novel by themselves, even 
without regarding incompatibilism–compatibilism debate about freedom 
of the will and action. He also analyses the notion of moral responsibility 
which is closely related to the free will problem. Of course, according to 
what I have said, I consider that some of the claims are not compatible 
with free will, but can be used without much additional effort for other 
frames of reference in incompatibilism– compatibilism debate or they can 
be discussed regardless of incompatibilism–compatibilism debate.
Despite my criticism and despite my belief that compatibilism in any 
version is untenable position regarding free will debate, my recommenda-
tion for this terrific book is: you must read it by your own free will!4
3 About these matters see for example Balaguer (2010).
4  Very personal footnote: The work on this text was partly supported by Croatian peo-
ple through Ministry of Science, Education and Sport (Contract No. 191–0091328–1091). 
I would like to add that despite INA-MOL conflict, I consider Hungary and Hungarian 
people as one of the most friendly to Croatia, and Croatians, including me, like them; 
and I would like to thank that I had the opportunity to spent two semesters in 1999–2000 
at Central European University, Budapest––one of the most beautiful periods of my life. 
Thanks are due to Ferenc also! 
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